Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 1

Article 1

November 2022

J.E.F.M. V. LYNCH: THE JURISDICTIONAL EXCLUSION OF LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FOR IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
KOURTNEY SPEER

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
KOURTNEY SPEER, J.E.F.M. V. LYNCH: THE JURISDICTIONAL EXCLUSION OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
FOR IMMIGRANT CHILDREN, 52 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2022).
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol52/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized editor of GGU Law Digital
Commons.

SPEER: J.E.F.M. V. LYNCH: THE JURISDICTIONAL EXCLUSION OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR IMMIGRANT CHILDREN

NOTE
J.E.F.M. V. LYNCH: THE JURISDICTIONAL
EXCLUSION OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
FOR IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
KOURTNEY SPEER *
The border crisis created what has been called a perfect storm in
immigration courts, as children wind their way from border crossings to
immigration proceedings. The storm has battered immigration courtrooms crowded with young defendants but lacking lawyers and judges to
handle the sheer volume of cases.1
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, seventy unaccompanied immigrant children had pending
cases in immigration court.2 By 2017 the number of pending cases
against unaccompanied minors had increased exponentially to 88,069.3
Of the 2017 pending cases, 55,651 were filed in 2014.4 J.E.F.M., the lead
plaintiff, was one out of almost 90,000 children left to fend for themselves in this complex legal process.5 Under controlling law and precedent, unaccompanied immigrant children do not have a right to court-

* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2022; B. A. History, Aurora
University, Dec. 2018. Executive Articles Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review.
1
J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1039 (9th Cir. 2016) (McKeown J., concurring) (quotations omitted).
2
TRAC IMMIGRATION, Children: Amid a Growing Court Backlog Many Still Unrepresented,
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/482/.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chief Immigr. Judge, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev.,
to all Immigr. Judges, 1 (Nov. 13, 2020) (on file with U.S. Department of Justice), available at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download.
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appointed counsel during their legal removal proceedings.6 Without the
assistance of legal counsel, immigrant children as young as three years
old must file legal documents, represent themselves in front of immigration judges against trained government lawyers, and establish complete
records for their inevitable appeals.7 Yet, there are reports of these young
immigrant children climbing up on court room tables during their immigration proceedings.8 Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, Jack Weil
stated, “I’ve taught immigration law literally to three year olds and four
year olds. It takes a lot of time. It takes a lot of patience. They get it. It’s
not the most efficient, but it can be done.”9 Despite the United States’
structured and sophisticated legal system, which was developed to ensure
justice, toddlers are expected to navigate one of the country’s most complex laws—the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)—second only
to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.10 Moreover, the section of
the INA that addresses the judicial review of orders of removal, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252, has not been amended since 2005,11 despite the immense
changes in the landscape of immigration law since then. Therefore, it is
time to update the law.12
The concern of whether unaccompanied immigrant children have the
right to counsel in their removal proceedings has long been deliberated
by courts.13 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
an opportunity to address whether immigrant children do have a right to
legal representation, in J.E.F.M. v. Lynch.14 However, instead of resolving that issue, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
6
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, https://immigrantjustice.org/issues/unaccompanied-immigrant-children (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
7
See Weil, J., Dep. 69:8-70:24, J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, Ann Medis, Job no. 15047 (Oct. 15, 2015)
(implying that because these children are provided training in immigration law that they are expected
to file legal documents, represent themselves in front of an immigration judge against a government
lawyer, and establish a complete record to have for an appeal.).
8
Christina Jewett, Immigrant Toddlers Ordered to Appear in Court Alone, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Jun. 27, 2018) https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/27/immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appearcourt-alone/.
9
Weil, J., Dep. 69:24-70:3, J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, Ann Medis, Job no. 15047 (Oct. 15, 2015).
10
Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dept. of Immigration and Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1987) (quoting ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
ALIENS 107 (Greenwood Press, 1985)).
11
8 U.S.C § 1252 (2005). The last amendment came in 2005 under the REAL ID Act of
2005. Infra note 105.
12
The Biden Administration recently proposed new legislation: the U.S. Citizenship Act of
2021. This act has the stated purpose of “restor[ing] humanity and American values to our immigration system.” U.S. Citizenship Act H.R. 1177, 117th Cong. (2021).
13
Ninth Circuit Dodges Question of Right to Counsel for Kids in Immigration Cases, NCCRC.ORG (May 2, 2019) http://civilrighttocounsel.org/major_developments/880.
14
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1026.
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jurisdiction.15 In J.E.F.M., a group of undocumented immigrant children
sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington asserting a statutory and constitutional right to counsel16 during
their removal proceedings.17 The district court reached a favorable decision on the merits for both claims asserted by the Children, finding that
the court had proper subject matter jurisdiction to preside over the Children’s right to counsel claims.18 However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the decision and declared that because the Children’s claims
were an “inextricable part” of the administrative process,19 the claims
must be exhausted and because the Children had not exhausted their
claims, they were dismissed.20
The Ninth Circuit avoided the review of this paramount issue regarding legal representation for immigrant children because the court determined that the Children failed to exhaust their remedies as required by
the INA, § 1252(b)(9) (“channeling provision”) making it a non-final order, unreviewable by the Ninth Circuit.21 Without subject matter jurisdiction, the court lacked authority to review the substantive issue.22
However, in J.E.F.M., the Ninth Circuit misapplied the INA exhaustion
requirement23 which left thousands of immigrant children without legal
15
Id. This case was previously known as J.E.F.M. v. Holder then later known as J.E.F.M. v.
Whitaker. Subject matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief
sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or status of things. Subjectmatter jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
16
The right to counsel refers to the constitutional right of a defendant to be represented and
assisted by a lawyer in her defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides this
right to defendants in federal prosecutions. Id. In civil cases, courts have routinely recognized a
defendant’s right to counsel exists only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
17
J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A removal proceeding
is the formal proceeding an immigrant goes through before being removed/deported. Executive Office for Immigration Review, An Agency Guide, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 2 (Dec. 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download.
18
Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1120.
19
Immigration law is considered a hybrid between administrative law and constitutional law.
Traditional administrative law is administered by administrative agencies created by Congress.
Those administrative agencies often perform their own adjudicatory functions before a claim is sent
to a federal court. Administrative Law, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_law (last visited, Aug. 12, 2021).
20
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1033, 1038. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires a person challenging an agency’s decision to first challenge that decision through the administrative avenues before seeking judicial review in a federal court. 33 Fed. Pract. & Proc. Judicial Review § 8363 (2d ed.) (database updated April 2021).
21
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
22
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1038.
23
In early 2020, a district court in Virginia ruled § 1252 subsection (g) unconstitutional but
did not invalidate § 1252 in its entirety. Therefore, this article will focus on sections of § 1252 that
have not been found to be unconstitutional. Joshua M. v. Barr, 439 F. Supp. 3d 632, 676 (E.D. Va.
2020).
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representation during their removal proceedings. The practical effect of
the Ninth Circuit’s decision is that it forced the Children to exhaust the
administrative process before raising their right to counsel claims with a
district court.24 The Ninth Circuit should have found that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction under the channeling provision, as
the claim—a constitutional due process right to counsel—was collateral
to, or outside of, the removal process and therefore not barred by the
final order provision. Moreover, as a matter of fairness, requiring the
Children to exhaust all administrative requirements and remedies limits
their ability to appeal an unfavorable determination, because without
proper representation they cannot fully develop the record for appeal.
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to reach the substantive issue was not only a
missed opportunity to clarify the application of the INA removal proceeding requirements but also a detrimental failure to the thousands of
children that were, and are, in desperate need of legal counsel.
Part I of this Note discusses the following: (1) the facts and procedural history of J.E.F.M. v. Lynch; (2) the Ninth Circuit’s application and
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252; and (3) a brief summary of Judge
Berzon’s dissent. Part II provides a brief overview of the current immigration process as it now stands and the history of immigration laws in
the United States. Part III provides background information on the right
to counsel and its application to removal hearings Finally, Part IV of this
Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in its decision to dismiss the
Children’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that immigrant children should have a right to counsel during their removal
proceedings.
I.

J.E.F.M. V. LYNCH: THE FINDING

OF IMPROPER JURISDICTION

In J.E.F.M., the plaintiffs (the “Children”) sued the United States
claiming a statutory and constitutional right to appointed counsel in immigration proceedings.25 In support of their claims, the Children argued
that as minors they “lack[ed] the intellectual and emotional capacity of
adults,” but were still expected to appear for their complex immigration
proceedings against educated attorneys without representation of their
own.26 The Children alleged they were unable to receive a “full and fair

24

Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1029, 1038.
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1029.
26
Id. at 1029-30.
25
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opportunity” to identify defenses, seek relief, and establish an adequate
record for appeal.27
In July 2014, the Children filed their complaint with the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle.28
The class of plaintiffs included eight children, who were younger than
eighteen and who were unrepresented in their complex removal proceedings.29 The Children in the class were in various stages of their own
removal proceedings.30
The named plaintiff,31 J.E.F.M.’s story illustrates the struggles experienced by each individual plaintiff.32 J.E.F.M. was a ten-year-old boy
from El Salvador.33 J.E.F.M.’s father, a former gang member in El Salvador, converted to Christianity.34 J.E.F.M.’s parents ran a rehabilitation
center in El Salvador for young people who left or were trying to leave
gangs.35 Gang members threatened J.E.F.M.’s parents, and later killed
his father and cousin.36 J.E.F.M., his two siblings, and his mother witnessed his father’s brutal murder right outside of their house in El Salvador.37 J.E.F.M.’s mother feared for her life, and therefore, fled El
Salvador, leaving her three children with their grandmother.38
27
See id. at 1030 (identifying the complex appeals process that unaccompanied immigrant
children would have to face, such as establishing an adequate record for appeal.).
28
Complaint at 1 of Document 1, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash.
2015) (No. 2:14-cv-01026).
29
The certified class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) was, “All individuals under the age of eighteen (18) who: (1) are in removal proceedings, as defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a, within the boundaries of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, on or after the date of entry of this
Order; (2) were not admitted to the United States and are alleged, in such removal proceedings, to be
“inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182; (3) are without legal representation, meaning (a) an attorney. . .; (4) are financially unable to obtain such legal representation; and (5) are potentially eligible
for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), or protection under the Convention Against Torture, or are potentially able to make a colorable claim of
United States citizenship. Order at 1-2, Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119.
30
Within this class of children, some children did not have removal proceedings commenced
against them while others were in ongoing removal proceedings. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1123.
31
Each class action suit has a class representative which is someone who sues on behalf of a
group of plaintiffs in a class action. Class Representative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
32
The seven other plaintiffs were as follows: (1) J.E.F.M.’s thirteen-year-old brother and
fifteen-year-old sister; (2) a fourteen-year-old girl fleeing from El Salvador after being threatened
and attacked by gangs; (3) a fifteen-year-old boy who was abandoned and abused in Guatemala; (4)
a sixteen-year-old boy with special needs who escaped brutal violence from Honduras; and (5) a
seventeen-year-old boy who fled gang violence from Guatemala. Complaint at 5.
33
Complaint at 15.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2022

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 1

28

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Several years later, gang members targeted J.E.F.M. and his siblings
and told them they had to join the gang or else they too would be
harmed.39 It was at this point, around July, 2013, when J.E.F.M. and his
two siblings fled El Salvador, entered the United States, and were apprehended by immigration officials.40 J.E.F.M., like other unaccompanied
immigrant children in the class, began navigating his legal immigration
proceedings without representation.41 Although each child involved in
the class may not have had exactly the same experiences, all the Children
shared three fundamental characteristics: (1) the Government initiated
immigration proceedings against them; (2) they were forced to appear
unrepresented in complex court proceedings; and (3) they were all children under the age of 18, and therefore presumably lacked the intellectual and emotional capacity of adults.42 The Children alleged violations
of the INA and violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.43
Over the next year, the Children’s counsel44 worked diligently to
certify the class.45 Initially, the plaintiffs asserted the class should consist
of: “[a]ll individuals under the age of eighteen (18) who are or will be in
immigration proceedings on or after July 9, 2014, without legal representation in their immigration proceedings.46 However, the Government
challenged the certification of the class claiming factual and legal differences amongst the plaintiffs but failed to specify these differences.47 Ultimately, the court denied this proposed class without prejudice due to
the class being “too expansive to meet the commonality and typicality
requirements.”48 After the Children’s fourth motion, the court found that
the Children satisfied the class certification requirements.49
39

Id.
Id.
41
Complaint at 2.
42
Complaint at 8.
43
Complaint at 25. The Fifth Amendment does provide protection for noncitizens. See infra
note 125.
44
The counsel referred to here represents the children for their right to counsel claim, not for
their individual removal proceedings.
45
There are four prerequisites a class must satisfy in order to maintain a class action: (1)
Numerosity, (2) Commonality, (3) Typicality, and (4) Adequacy. Class Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
46
Complaint at 23.
47
Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 2 of Document 65,
J.E.F.M. v. Holder, F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
48
Order at 3. Commonality means that members of the class share at least one issue of law or
fact whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of class members. Commonality,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Typicality means the claims of defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defense of the whole class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
49
See Supra note 29.
40

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol52/iss1/1

6

SPEER: J.E.F.M. V. LYNCH: THE JURISDICTIONAL EXCLUSION OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR IMMIGRANT CHILDREN

2022]

J.E.F.M. v. Lynch

29

On April 13, 2015, district court Judge Zilly held that §§ 1252(a)(5)
and (b)(9) did not bar the Children’s due process claim under the Fifth
Amendment but the district court did lack jurisdiction to hear the Children’s statutory claim.50 The Attorney General filed an interlocutory appeal51 to the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that the district court erred in
finding it had jurisdiction over the Children’s due process claim.52 In
September 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding
regarding the children’s statutory claim because “the [constitutional] balancing standard does not apply and . . . concerns about the adequacy of
administrative record are not warranted.”53 However, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court’s finding as to the Children’s due process
claim.54
The court, through statutory interpretation of sections 1252(a)(5)
(“Petition for Review Provision”) and (b)(9) found there was not proper
subject matter jurisdiction.55 The court stated, “Congress has clearly provided that all claims—whether statutory or constitutional—that ‘aris[e]
from’ immigration removal proceedings can only be brought through the
petition for review [(“PFR”)] process in the federal court of appeals.”56
While the court recognized the gravity of the Children’s claims, it nonetheless held the statutes did not allow the Children to bypass the immigration courts by proceeding directly to a district court.57 Further, the
court held that there was no violation of due process.58
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis began with an introduction to
§ 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9), which dictate when and how one may
challenge an order of removal.59 According to the Ninth Circuit, these
50

Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1144.
An interlocutory appeal is an appeal that occurs before the trial court’s final ruling on the
entire case. Some interlocutory appeals involve legal points necessary to the determination of the
case. Appeal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
52
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1029-30.
53
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1030.
54
Id. at 1029. After extensive internal debate, the legal team chose not to seek certiorari and
therefore the case was then dismissed by the district court. E-mail from Ahilan Arulanantham, Senior Counsel, ACLU Immigrant’s Rights Project, to author (March 10, 2021, 9:51am) (on file with
author).
55
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1029.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1031.
51
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provisions “d[o] not foreclose all judicial review of agency actions,” but
merely channel the judicial review of final orders.60
Next, the Ninth Circuit explained that § 1252(b)(9), the channeling
provision, contains “built-in limitations”.61 While the channeling provision requires that, “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . .
arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien
. . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order [of removal]” the court noted that “arising from” limits the application of the
provision in some situations.62 This limitation, the court concluded, excluded any claim that did not yet “arise from” the removal proceedings
from the PFR process. Despite this finding, which may have led to a
favorable decision for the Children, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
Children’s right to counsel claim did arise from their removal proceedings,63 thus the channeling provision applied and the Children’s claim
had to be based on a final order.64 The Court reasoned that since the
Children’s “claims [were] bound up in and an inextricable part of the
administrative process,” they arose from the removal process.65 To reach
this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on the First Circuit case of Aguilar v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement.66
In Aguilar the First Circuit held that § 1252(b)(9) did bar subject
matter jurisdiction over the petitioners’ right to counsel claims.67 The
court found that the petitioners failed to show they would be irreparably
harmed due to no meaningful judicial review if required to exhaust their
claims.68 Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the court in Aguilar, did not read
the phrase “arising from” found in § 1252(b)(9) to apply to all removal
claims.69 The First Circuit also recognized that most courts are willing to
classify claims as collateral when “requiring exhaustion would foreclose
all meaningful judicial review.”70 However, the Ninth Circuit focused on
the First Circuit’s statement that “right to counsel possesses a direct link
to, and is inextricably intertwined with, the administrative process” to
reach its conclusion that the Children’s right to counsel claim must be
60

Id.
Id. at 1032.
62
§ 1252(b)(9).
63
Id. at 1032-33.
64
Id. at 1033.
65
Id. at 1033.
66
In Aguilar, the petitioners alleged that ICE inhibited their exercise of the right to counsel
due to ICE officers turning away lawyers who attempted to speak with petitioners at the detention
center. Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007)
67
Id. at 14.
68
Id. at 14.
69
Id. at 10.
70
Id. at 12 (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994)).
61
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exhausted, rather than considering the lack of meaningful juridical review for the Children.71
In addition, the Ninth Circuit turned to the legislative history of the
INA and its amendments.72 Here, the court found that the history and
amendments of the INA confirmed that:
Congress intended to channel all claims arising from removal proceedings to the federal courts of appeals and bypass the district courts.73
[The Ninth Circuit stated that], [c]onsolidation of the review process
for immigration orders of removal began in 1961, when Congress
amended the INA to channel immigrants’ challenges to their removal
proceedings to the courts of appeals via the PFR.74

In 1996 Congress appealed the 1961 statute and enacted the channeling provision.75 The Ninth Circuit stated that the enactment of the channeling provision in 1996 was a response to the Supreme Court ruling in
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center.76 In McNary, the Supreme Court
laid out the “blueprint” for what would ultimately be codified as
§ 1252(b)(9).77 Because of the Supreme Court’s holding, the Ninth Circuit here presumed that Congress drafted the channeling provision with
its eye on that precedent and therefore neatly tracked the policy and practice of the jurisdiction-channeling language found in McNary with the
newly amended provision of § 1252(b)(9).78 Two of the guiding principles developed from the McNary holding were as follows: (1) the court
must consider whether the claim is challenging a procedure or policy
collateral to the removal proceeding and (2) whether the plaintiff’s claim
is ripe.79
In sum, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the legislative history and
chronology of the amendments to the channeling provision eliminated
71

Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13).
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1033.
73
Id. at 1033.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1033 n5.
76
Id at 1033. In McNary, a group of immigrants applied for amnesty under the special agricultural workers (SAW) program and filed an action in district court alleging injuries caused by
“unlawful practices and policies” adopted by the INS. The Court held that the district court did have
jurisdiction to hear the challenge because the controlling statute only channeled individual claims
and not wider policy claims through the PFR process. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S
479, 483, 487 (1991).
77
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1034 (citing McNary 498 U.S at 487.
78
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1035.
79
Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, 189 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Reno v. Catholic
Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 (1993)) (determining ripeness by whether the plaintiffs have taken
the affirmative steps they could take before INS blocked their path.).
72

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2022

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 1

32

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

any concern or confusion regarding the plain meaning of the statute.80
Further, it reasoned that §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(5) channel review of
“all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges, through the PFR
process whenever they ‘arise from’ removal proceedings.”81 Therefore,
because the Ninth Circuit determined the Children’s right to counsel
claims “arise from” their removal proceedings, the claims must be
brought through the PFR process.82 Due to this finding, the Ninth Circuit
concluded the district court did not have jurisdiction over the Children’s
claims.83
B. AFTER THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
In 2018, the Children filed a petition for rehearing en banc in the
Ninth Circuit.84 The panel voted to deny the petition for rehearing.85
However, Judge Marsha Berzon and four other Circuit Judges authored a
dissent to the denial order.86 Judge Berzon reasoned in her dissent that
the Children were not challenging orders of removal but rather were
challenging that “they have a due process and statutory right to appointed
counsel in the removal proceedings they face.”87 Judge Berzon stated,
[t]he panel did not allow the merits of [the Children’s] right-to-counsel
claim to be heard. Instead, it [the panel] shut the courthouse doors on
them, broadly proclaiming that 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(9) strips district
courts of jurisdiction to hear “any issue—whether legal or factual—
arising from any removal related activity.”88

Judge Berzon reasoned that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) is not applicable
to this case because the statute “bars district court review of a claim only
where an order of removal has been entered and an individual seeks relief from that order. . .[and] the class of children here have not reached
80

Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1035.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
J.E.F.M. v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1157 (9th Cir. 2018). A petition for rehearing en banc
is “a request that the full appellate court consider a panel decision that conflicts with a precedent of
either the court itself or the highest court within the jurisdiction, with the additional requirement that
the proceeding must involve one or more questions of exceptional importance. Rehearing En Banc,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
85
Whitaker, 908 F.3d at 1157.
86
Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting). Judge Berzon was confirmed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals on March 9, 2000 where she still sits today. Federal Judicial Center, Berzon, Marsha Siegel,
FJC.GOV (last visited Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/berzon-marsha-siegel.
87
Whitaker, 908 F.3d at 1158.
88
Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
81
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that stage . . .,” meaning that the Children are not contesting a final order
removal.89
Additionally, Judge Berzon relied on the Supreme Court case, Jennings v. Rodriguez, which held that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar district
court review of a challenge to immigration detention because the detention claims at issue were not “challenging any part of the [removal] process. . ..”90 Further, Judge Berzon disagreed with the panel’s decision
that the right to counsel claim was linked to the Children’s removal proceeding.91 Judge Berzon relied on Martinez v. Napolitano to determine
whether a claim is “inextricably linked” to an order of removal.92 Martinez clarified that “distinction between an independent claim and indirect
challenge will turn on the substance of the relief that a plaintiff is
seeking.”93
Lastly, Judge Berzon acknowledged the McNary case—a case the
Ninth Circuit did not refer to in its opinion.94 Judge Berzon emphasized
that, under McNary, the Children’s lack of representation created a legitimate possibility that they would not be able to adequately preserve the
record for appeal, which would prevent meaningful judicial review.95
Judge Berzon acknowledged that the Children did in fact present
“weighty constitutional issues” and “the law require[d] that [the panel] at
least hear them out.”96
II. THE IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND APPLICABLE LAWS
A. THE ASYLUM AND REMOVAL PROCESSES
An immigrant. or sometimes referred to as a refugee is a person who
is unable or unwilling to return to their country due to fear of persecution.97 Once a refugee enters the United States, they may seek asylum.
One way an immigrant enters the asylum process is through what is
called affirmative asylum, which occurs when an immigrant affirmatively applies for asylum.98 This is generally referred to as asylum pro89

Id. at 1158-59 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1160 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018)).
91
Whitaker, 908 F.3d at 1160 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 1162 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
93
Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting) (quoting Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir.
2012)).
94
Whitaker, 908 F.3d at 1162 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
95
Id. at 1163 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing McNary, 498 U.S. at 483).
96
Whitaker, 908 F.3d at 1165.
97
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
98
Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 2-3 (June 11, 2020), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states.
90
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ceedings. A second avenue is through defensive asylum.99 Defensive
asylum applies to immigrants already in the removal process and acts as
a defense against the removal.”100 This is generally referred to as removal proceedings.101
The removal process involves numerous steps, many of which are
the same for both adult immigrants and unaccompanied immigrant children. First, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiates the
removal proceeding by serving the immigrant with a Notice to Appear
(“NTA”) and files the NTA with the Department of Justice’s Executive
Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).102 The NTA orders the immigrant to appear before an immigration judge and provides them with information such as the removal proceedings, any alleged violations, and
any consequences that stem from a refusal to participate in the
proceedings.103
During removal proceedings, a DHS attorney represents the Government, and the respondent (immigrant) may provide a defense or apply for
protection or relief with or without an attorney or representative.104
When the immigration court receives the NTA, it schedules an initial
hearing where the judge will determine if the applicant is removable.105
If the court finds that the person is removable, he or she may then apply
for withholding of removal.106 This request will initiate an individual
merits hearing at which time the DHS attorney and the respondent can
present arguments and evidence before the judge who then determines if
the immigrant is eligible for withholding of removal.107
If the respondent does not appear for a scheduled hearing, the immigration judge will conduct an in absentia hearing, “which is a removal
hearing without the respondent present.”108 During this type of hearing,
the immigration judge will order the absent respondent to be removed in
absentia if DHS can establish evidence that shows the respondent was
properly notified with the pertinent details of the hearing.109 Within
99

Id.
Id. at 2.
101
J.E.F.M. v. Lynch involves removal proceedings—-i.e. “defensive asylum” I would argue
however that indigent immigrant children should have the benefit of counsel in both affirmative and
defensive asylum cases and the reader can assume the arguments herein apply to both.
102
Executive Office for Immigration Review, An Agency Guide, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 2
(Dec. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
100
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thirty days of the immigration judge’s final order, either party may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) which will conduct a
review of the previous order by conducting a paper or record review.110
This means that the BIA rarely hears oral arguments when making decisions on the appeal and instead relies on what has been established in the
official record from the immigration judge’s hearing.111 If the BIA affirms the immigration judge’s order to remove the respondent, the respondent may then file an appeal to the appropriate federal circuit court
of appeals.112
B. THE APPLICABLE LAWS: § 1252 AND THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005
Immigration laws are tremendously fluid and ever changing. In
1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) which significantly changed the
previously enacted Immigration and Nationality Act.113 Notably, through
the enactment of the IIRIRA, Congress made amendments to § 1252. It
is through the IIRIRA that Congress adopted the channeling provision,
§ 1252(b)(9).114 Since its adoption, courts have failed to reach a consensus regarding the interpretation of the channeling provision. To provide
the courts with additional clarity, Congress responded by enacting the
Real ID Act of 2005115 to confirm that the restrictions imposed by the
IIRIA do, in fact repeal habeas jurisdiction and allow for the channeling
of all claim that arise from a removal proceeding.116 Together, both the
IIRIRA and the Real ID Act amended the INA and created a narrow
channeling mechanism, codified in both §§ 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9), which
110

Id. at 7.
Id. at 3.
112
Id. at 7.
113
Major US Immigration Laws, 1790 - Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., (Mar. 2013),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/CIR-1790Timeline.pdf.
114
§ 1252(b)(9).
115
The Real ID Act was part of a series of statutes enacted to help in the fight against terrorism. After the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States formed a “9/11
Commission” whose purpose was to reform the United States intelligence community and to implement security measures in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. The History of Federal Requirements for State Issued Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/history-behind-the-real-id-act.aspx (last
visited Jan. 24, 2021).
116
Jill E Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The Certificate of
Reviewability, 9 NEV. L. J. 499, 504 (2008). Habeas jurisdiction refers to the courts ability to hear
habeas corpus claims. Habeas corpus is a write employed to bring a person before a court, most
frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal. Habeas Corpus,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
111
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expedites claims arising from removal proceedings to the court of appeals and bypasses the district courts.
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: WHERE IT COMES FROM AND WHOM IT
PROTECTS
The Supreme Court has extended the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in certain non-criminal cases. The Supreme Court deemed the
right to counsel imperative in youth law and juvenile proceedings.117 Juvenile proceedings are considered civil in nature118 and are treated different from adult criminal proceedings. For example, in adult criminal cases
the government’s position is the prosecuting attorney, whereas in juvenile cases, the government proceeds parens patrie or in a protective
role,119 not as an adversary.120 Even though juvenile proceedings are
deemed civil in nature, the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel is a Constitutional right that transcends beyond the traditional criminal proceeding.121 In In re Gault, the Court held that the personal interest
in freedom—not the nature of the proceeding—triggered the right to appointed counsel.122 Later in Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, the
Court summarized its precedent to mean “that an indigent litigant has a
right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of
his physical liberty.”123
In addition to the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a
right to counsel exists through the Due Process Clause (“DPC”) of the
Fifth Amendment.124 The right to counsel afforded by the DPC applies to
both citizens and noncitizens125 and “establishes a right to a full and fair
hearing in removal cases for noncitizens.”126 At minimum, a full and fair
117

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
119
Parens Patriae, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
parens_patriae (last visited Aug. 14, 2021). (“Under parens patriae, a state or court has a paternal and
protective role over its citizens or others subject to its jurisdiction.”).
120
Kent, 383 U.S. at 555 (finding that the lack of a sufficient investigation prior to a juvenile
court waiver of jurisdiction was a reversible error).
121
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
122
Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring).
123
In Lassiter, a mother alleged a violation of her due process rights in her parental status
termination proceeding for which she was not represented by an attorney. Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc.
Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981). The court found that with regard to the “fundamental fairness” requirement of the Due Process Clause there is a presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to
appointed counsel if physical liberty is at stake. Id.
124
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
125
Torres v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1063 (C.D. Cal.
2019) (holding the petitioner’s conditions of confinement claims are not inextricably a part of the
removal process, and as such § 1252’s channeling mechanism does not apply).
126
Torres, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 1063.
118
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hearing provides an opportunity to present and rebut evidence and to
cross-examine witnesses.127 Although the Supreme Court has yet to find
a categorical right to counsel for children during their immigration proceedings, the Court has implemented the balancing test from Mathews v.
Eldridge to analyze whether a violation of an individual’s due process
rights occurred.128
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN PART BY DISMISSING J.E.F.M. FOR
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE CHANNELING
PROVISION
The Ninth Circuit relied on its interpretation of the channeling provision to hold that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the Children’s claims because the claims “arose from” the Children’s
removal proceedings.129 The Court erred in its interpretation which unjustly impacted the lives of the Children and thousands of other unaccompanied children facing removal proceedings. Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit overlooked the part of the statute that renders it only applicable to
final orders of removal—“judicial review of all questions of law and
fact. . . arising from any action . . . brought to remove an [immigrant] . . .
under this title shall be available only in judicial review of a final order
under this section.”130 By stating, “[the statute] mean[s] that any issue—
whether legal or factual arising from any removal-related activity can be
reviewed only through the PFR process,” the Ninth Circuit wrongly interpreted § 1252(b)(9) and rendered it irreconcilable with its plain
meaning.131
First, as Judge Berzon stated in her dissent, the channeling provision
was inapplicable to the Children’s claims because the Children were not
appealing a final order of removal.132 Judge Berzon pointed out that
§ 1252(b)(9) is a subsection and therefore a requirement under § 1252
titled, “Requirements for review of orders of removal.”133 Therefore,
§ 1252(b)(9) cannot apply to a claim that is made before an order of
127
Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Cinapian v. Holder, 567
F.3d 1067, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2009)).
128
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
129
Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1031.
130
§ 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added).
131
See Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1031 (noting § 1252(a)(5) likewise means that any issue arising
from any removal activity can only be reviewed through the PFR process).
132
Whitaker, 908 F.3d at 1159 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
133
§ 1252.
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removal has been rendered. As previously mentioned, the Children in
this case were still in removal proceedings and some had not even commenced the process which means there had not been a final order of
removal rendered for any of the Children in the class.134 Simply put, the
channeling mechanism of § 1252(b)(9) is inapplicable to the Children’s
claim because § 1252(b) as a whole applies only to review of final orders
for removal. The Ninth Circuit should not have relied on an inapplicable
provision as justification for holding there was no subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the Children should have been able to address their right to
counsel claim with the district court, just like any other aggrieved party.
Alternatively, even if the statute were applicable, the Children’s
claim did not “arise from” a final order of removal because J.E.F.M., like
Mr. Rodriguez in Jennings v. Rodriguez, alleged a constitutional violation of due process.135 When applying Jennings to J.E.F.M.’s case it becomes clear that the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the scope and
application of § 1252(b)(9). It is true that some of the Children were in
the process of a removal proceeding but as the Supreme Court pointed
out, it is simply too easy to assume § 1252(b)(9) swallows every collateral claim based on a causation justification such as, had the Children not
been in a removal proceeding they would not be bringing this constitutional right to counsel claim. The Supreme Court, considering the Ninth
Circuit’s holding and interpretation of the channeling provision, pointed
out that when an immigrant is in the removal process, any issue or claim
that may arise during that time would be considered to “arise from” that
very removal process.136 That expansive interpretation is what the Supreme Court wanted to avoid in Jennings. That expansive and extreme
interpretation led to staggering results. Namely, the fact that thousands of
immigrant children are left to defend and represent themselves while facing a very serious consequence—removal from the United States and
ultimately the deprivation of their physical liberty.137
134

See supra note 30.

135

In Jennings, the petitioner filed a habeas petition alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights in a district court due to his lengthy detention. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.
Ct. 830, 841 (2018). The Supreme Court held that § 1252(b)(9) did not strip it of subject matter
jurisdiction because an expansive interpretation of §1252(b)(9) would be absurd. Id. The Court realized interpreting § 1252(b)(9) in this extreme way would make most claims brought in addition to a
removal proceeding effectively unreviewable. Id. The Court concluded that the claim here did not
arise from Mr. Rodriguez’s removal proceeding but rather he was challenging the collateral issue of
length of detention. See Id.
136

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018).
Egkolfopoulou, Misyrlena, The Thousands of Children Who Go to Immigration Court
Alone, (Aug. 21, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/children-immigrationcourt/567490/.
137
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit relied on the First Circuit’s case of
Aguilar to conclude that right to counsel claims do “arise from” removal
proceedings and that there was no foreclosure of meaningful judicial review for the Children.138 While Aguilar is convincing, the Children’s
claim is distinguishable because the Children would be foreclosed meaningful judicial review. The Children cannot receive effective relief for
their right to counsel claim simply by navigating the channels deliberately dredged by Congress, whereas in Aguilar the court found the plaintiff could receive effective relief because the adult petitioners had the
ability to navigate those channels.139
The First Circuit found it completely practical for Mr. Aguilar to
follow the INA’s required procedure—immigration judge first, then BIA,
then finally the court of appeals.140 This same task would be nearly impossible to ask of immigrant children. A child is likely incapable of navigating this process by themselves and should not be expected to do so.
Because of the large differences in capabilities between adults and children—differences the Supreme Court has already recognized in cases
like In re Gault and Lassiter—foreclosing immigrant children from raising their right to counsel claim in a district court would foreclose them
from any meaningful judicial review since there would likely be no claim
to review due to the inability of the Children to establish a proper record
with a lower court. The First Circuit, aware of this potential consequence, acknowledged that “certain claims, by reason of the nature of the
right asserted, cannot be raised efficaciously within the administrative
proceeding.”141 Here, a right to counsel claim raised by immigrant children cannot be raised efficaciously within the administrative proceeding.
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit utilized the three Mathews
factors to determine if Mr. Aguilar’s right to due process had been implicated.142 The court held that due process had not been violated on the
right to counsel claim because the petitioners in Aguilar did not satisfactorily explain how or why they would be irreparably harmed if required
to exhaust their right to counsel claim.143 However, applying those same
three Mathews factors to the Children’s claim, it is clear that the Children could not and would not receive effective relief for their alleged
violations of the right to counsel, which would cause them irreparable
harm.
138

Aguilar,
Aguilar,
140
Aguilar,
141
Aguilar,
142
Aguilar,
143
Aguilar,
139

510 F.3d at 14.
10 F.3d at 14.
510 F.3d at 14.
510 F.3d at 11.
510 F.3d at 14.
510 F.3d at 14.
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B. THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATED THE CHILDREN’S DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Supreme Court established a balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge.144 The three factors used for the balancing test are:
[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2]
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; [3] the government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.145

The Ninth Circuit did not address any of these factors in J.E.F.M.
Had the court appropriately applied the Supreme Court’s precedent, it
may have reached a different result.
1. The Children’s Private Interest to Receive a Full and Fair
Hearing Was Affected
Here, the private interest at issue was the Children’s ability to receive adequate representation by an attorney throughout their removal
proceedings. This interest encompassed the Children’s Fifth Amendment
right to a full and fair hearing. The Fifth Amendment right to due process
as codified in the Bill of Rights is considered a fundamental right.146
Therefore, because the private interest in question here is a fundamental
right, the importance of the interest weighs heavily in favor of the Children. The Children have an interest in a full and fair hearing to determine
their eligibility for asylum. The potential consequences of not being afforded a full and fair hearing include being forced to return to violence,
poverty, and oppression. The denial of a fair hearing when these important liberty interests are on the line is a denial of due process and strongly
weighs in favor of the Children. For J.E.F.M., this denial of a full and
fair hearing meant being sent back to El Salvador and having to face the
gang members who he witnessed kill his father.
144

In Mathews, the Court held that under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
Mathews was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits
after balancing the three factors to determine if Mathews due process had been violated. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 349.
145
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
146
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997); see, e.g., Fundamental right, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A fundamental right is a right derived from natural or fundamental law.”).
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2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Outweighs Established
Safeguards
Next, there is a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of the Children’s due process rights by stripping the district court of jurisdiction to
hear the constitutional right to counsel claim. The result will likely be the
removal of these children from the United States, which is a serious risk.
While there are some special safeguards put in place specifically for unaccompanied children representing themselves, these safeguards clearly
do not provide the equivalent protection provided by legal counsel. For
example, one of the safeguards, implemented in 2014 by the Office of
the Chief Immigration Judge, was The Friend of the Court Model for
Unaccompanied Minors in Immigration Proceedings.147 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the addition of The Friend of the Court Model acted as
an additional protection which the Children could rely on.148 However,
that is not what the program does.
The Office of the Chief of Immigration Judge sent a memo which
stated, a friend of the court is defined as “a bystander whose mission is to
aid the court, to act only for the personal benefit of the court.”149 In
summation, the friend of the court “serves in a non-representational role,
the scope of which is determined by the court in its discretion.”150 It is
clear that the probative value of this safeguard is not strong. In the memo
the Chief Immigration Judge sent out, he wrote in bold letters, “The
Friend of the Court does not represent a respondent.”151 Further, the
friend of the court is not an attorney or even a trained professional, so it
falls short of the Children’s needs. Therefore, this protection was not put
into place to assist unaccompanied children but rather the friend of the
court model assists the court and its needs.
An additional safeguard which the Ninth Circuit relied was the assumption that immigration judges always uphold their obligations to
thoroughly inquire whether the child understands their right to seek out
counsel and determine whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary.152 The Ninth Circuit further stated that when an immigrant is
proceeding pro se, “the judges have a duty to ‘fully develop the re147

Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1037.
Id. at 1037.
149
Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigr. Judge, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev.,
to all Immigr. Judges, 1 (Sept. 10, 2014) (on file with U.S. Department of Justice), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/12/21/
friendofcourtguidancememo091014.pdf.
150
Id. at 2.
151
Id.
152
See Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1033.
148
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cord.’”153 The Ninth Circuit made it clear that it relied on the individual
decisions of each immigration judge to fulfill his or her duties in order to
safeguard unrepresented immigrant children.154 This conflict of interest
poses a significant risk. The need for effective advocacy on behalf of
children should not be left to judge who is materially averse to the children. Moreover, immigration judges have large caseloads due to the
backlog of cases in the immigration system.155 The mere assumption that
each judge will diligently analyze each case is not reliable enough when
a child’s well-being and livelihood are on the line. Therefore, the risk to
due process is too high and the probative value of the safeguards put into
place are too low to require the Children to proceed unrepresented and to
require them to exhaust administrative remedies before addressing their
constitutional claims with a district court.
3. The Government’s Interest and the Fiscal Burden Do Not
Outweigh the Right to Counsel Under the Due Process
Clause
The third Mathews factor assesses the Government’s interest in the
alleged due process right as illustrated by the fiscal and administrative
burdens.156 Providing representation to unaccompanied immigrant children will necessarily require additional resources, time and expense. But
the Government also has a substantial interest in creating a more functional and ultimately more fiscally conscious legal process for immigrants. Further, the Government has demonstrated it has the ability or at
least the desire to provide legal representation for immigrant children
based on the newly introduced U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021.157 Section
292(c) of this proposed bill states in part, “the Attorney General shall
appoint, at the expense of the Government, counsel to represent any
noncitizen financially unable to obtain adequate representation in such
proceedings . . . .”158
Allowing children to be removed without adequate legal representation creates a disorganized, chaotic and inefficient process because children are unable to efficiently meet deadlines, file proper paperwork or
153

Id. at 1036 (quoting Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002)).
See Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1036-37.
155
According to the National Immigration Forum, as of August 7, 2018, each IJ had a backlog of over 2,000 cases. Fact Sheet: Immigration Courts, NAT’L IMMIGR. FORUM, (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-immigration-courts/.
156
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
157
Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment to Modernize our Immigration System.
158
U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021, H.R. 1177, 117th Cong. § 292(c) (2021).
154
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show up for scheduled meetings or hearings. These shortcomings, which
are no fault of the children, cause further delay within an already delayed
operation. The Government has an interest to ensure the immigration
system is running efficiently and effectively.
For example, the Institute for Defense Analyses (“IDA”) conducted
a study, in which it analyzed the potential financial impact on the Government if unaccompanied immigrant children were appointed counsel.
Through this study, IDA concluded that expanding representation to all
unaccompanied immigrant children would increase the rate of children
defeating removal by twenty-two percent and the overall number of these
immigration court hearings would drop by 6.7 percent.159 The IDA was
able to conclude what the financial commitment would look like by analyzing the ten years prior. The cost for a total expansion that would have
covered representation for all children over the last ten years was estimated to be around $157 million.160 IDA then broke down the estimated
cost per year based on the number of cases per year. For example, in
2016 when removal cases for unaccompanied children were at an alltime high, the estimate for that year was around $33 million, whereas the
estimate for 2008, when there were far fewer cases, was only around $4
million.161 The importance of this study shows that in comparison to
other Government expenditures,162 the ability for the Government to provide immigrant children with proper legal counsel during their immigration proceedings is absolutely possible.
Due to the legitimate Government interest here in ensuring effective
and efficient representation for immigrant children, the larger short-term
financial commitment should not be the obstacle that prohibits children
from receiving adequate representation and in turn guaranteeing their due
process right to a full and fair hearing. Because all three of the Mathews
factors weigh in favor of the Children, the Children’s right to due process was violated when they were forced to proceed in their removal
hearings without representation. By stripping the jurisdiction from the
district court, the Ninth Circuit deprived the Children of an avenue to
challenge this lack of due process. Moreover, as Judge Zilly pointed out,
159

Bryan W. Roberts et al., A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Expanding Federally Funded Counsel
Programs for Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in Removal Proceedings in the United States,
INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, i, iv (2019).
160
Id. at 72.
161
Id. at 73.
162
To illustrate, the federal government owns over 700,000 empty buildings that cost $1.7
billion each year to maintain. Marissa Laliberte, 11 Bizarre Things the U.S. Government Actually
Spent Money On, READER’S DIGEST (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.rd.com/list/wasteful-governmentspending-examples/. Additionally, the federal government spent $2.5 million to run a thirty second
ad during Super Bowl XLIX in 2015. Id.
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“[a]ssuming a [child], acting pro se, successfully navigated the immigration labyrinth all the way to the appropriate court of appeals, he or she
would arrive there without the record necessary to conduct the balancing
of interests required by Mathews.”163 Allowing the Children to present
their claims to a district court provides the Children ability to develop a
proper record to be heard on appeal.
C. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT DENIES THE CHILDREN ANY
MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Ninth Circuit failed to properly distinguish between a claim
arising from removal proceedings, versus a claim challenging the constitutional legality of a policy, and by eliding these two distinct claims into
the same type of claim, the Ninth Circuit’s application of the statue was
in error. As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit developed two guiding principles in McNary for determining whether there could be meaningful judicial review.164 First, the constitutional right to counsel claim
here involves a “procedure or policy” or the absence of one.165 The Children here are claiming inadequate representation. Like the claim in McNary, the Children’s claim is not specifically seeking review of each
individual removal proceeding. Rather, the Children are alleging that the
policy of not providing legal representation for unaccompanied immigrant children is unconstitutional.166
The consequence of children representing themselves pro se
throughout their immigration proceeding is that they are unable to fully
develop the administrative record. Children are largely incapable of
knowing when or how to make objections on their own behalf. The Children would likely be unaware of the fact that they must raise affirmative
defenses at this stage in the process or else they will be waived. This
means the administrative record would be insufficient to use as a basis
for a meaningful judicial review of the administrative decision. The Children could not appeal an issue that was not included in the administrative
record such as an objection to being unrepresented. The jurisdiction
channeling provision of § 1252(b)(9) does not preclude district court jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of a policy without referring to or relying on an individual’s claim about their removal
proceeding. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on §1252(b)(9) to strip the
district court of jurisdiction was an error.
163

Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1125.
Id. at 1130 (citing McNary, 498 U.S. at 498).
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Holder 107 F Supp. 3d at 1132.
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Id. at 1131.
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Second, the constitutional right to counsel claim is ripe because a
request to have counsel appointed would be futile in light of the current
immigration laws and regulations. An immigrant child would have to go
through his or her entire removal proceedings before raising the issue of
lack of representation on appeal. According to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in J.E.F.M., the Children would have to wait to raise their right to
counsel claim until after they were subjected to the entire removal process without any legal representation.167 Yet by the time that occurred,
the Children would likely have already failed to properly raise the objection of lack of representation and therefore it would not be included in
the administrative record. As previously stated, a party cannot appeal an
issue that is not included in the administrative record. The Children have
presented the Ninth Circuit with a purely legal issue as to whether a
violation of their constitutional right allows them to file a claim with the
district court instead of wandering their way through the removal process
on their own.
Additionally, the likelihood of an unpresented immigrant child having the ability to make it to the court of appeals is very low. A child first
must represent himself or herself in his or her own removal hearing in
front of an immigration judge. That same child must then figure out how,
when, and where to appeal to the BIA and only after that may the child
appeal the BIA’s decision to the court of appeals. Without legal representation from the very beginning, the Children are in most cases on a direct
path to deportation. In the year 2016, there was 9,896 unrepresented children who were removed from the U.S. compared to only 2,132 represented children who were removed.168 These numbers demonstrate that
an unrepresented minor in 2016 was 400 percent more likely to be removed than a represented minor.
In J.E.F.M., the Ninth Circuit did not address either of the McNary
guiding principles.169 Instead, the Ninth Circuit declared that because
McNary dealt with a different statute it was completely inapplicable to
this case.170 The Ninth Circuit did not acknowledge the fact that in prior
cases it had, along with the Supreme Court, applied the McNary guiding
principles to other cases that concerned interpreting statutes—statutes
which, just like § 1252(b)(9)—were different from the statute at issue in
167

Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1035.
Juveniles – Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, TRAC REP., https://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/juvenile/ (in State column, select “All”; in Represented column, toggle between “Not Represented” and “Represented”; in Outcome column, select “Removal Order”; then
view statistics in 2016).
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McNary.171 Therefore, this dismissal of McNary without incorporating
any application of the guiding principles developed by Ninth Circuit case
precedent seems like another way in which the Ninth Circuit attempted
to expedite its conclusion by only relying on its erroneous interpretation
of § 1252(b)(9) instead of taking into account the vulnerability and
unique situation in which immigrant children find themselves in when
expected to represent themselves and raise their own claims during the
removal process.
CONCLUSION
Immigrant children will continue to flee to the United States with the
hopes of a better and safer life. In fact, since the Biden Administration
took office, the number of unaccompanied minors apprehended at the
border has been on a sharp rise with 4,276 migrant children in custody as
of March 2021.172 Instead of exposing these children to the vicious cycle
that is the immigration administrative law system, the government, legislators and judicial branch, should be giving these children a fighting
chance by providing the bare minimum—a right to representation. Children like J.E.F.M. are not equipped to navigate their way through one of
the most complex set of laws in the United States. Many of these individuals are scared children who just fled the only home they knew in order
to survive.
The Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to make a lasting and impactful impression on immigration law but instead reached an erroneous
jurisdictional analysis. Had the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted and
applied § 1252(b)(9)—the very statute on which it purported to rely—it
would have concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Children’s due process right to counsel claim. Additionally, by stripping the district court of jurisdiction the Ninth Circuit
prevented the Children of any meaningful judicial review. The Children
were not equipped to properly bring evidence, question witnesses, and
raise objections on their own in order to establish a complete administrative record. The consequence of that oversight is the Children’s inability
171

In Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held the district court had jurisdiction
over a challenge to the procedures for accessing prior deportation files under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)
after applying the McNary guiding principles. Proyecto San Pablo, 189 F.3d at 1138. In GuerreroLasprilla, the Supreme Court applied well-established McNary principles when asked to interpret
§ 1252(a) and ultimately held that, “the Provision’s [§ 1252(a)] phrase “question of law” includes
the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts [and] the Fifth Circuit erred in
holding that it had no jurisdiction.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1064-1073 (2020).
172
Franco Ordoñez & Dana Farrington, Young Migrants Held by Border Patrol Far Longer
than Allowed, Document Shows, NPR (March 16, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/16/
977853878/young-migrants-held-by-border-patrol-far-longer-than-allowed-document-shows.
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to appeal issues that did not make it onto the administrative record at no
fault of their own.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Fifth Amendment protections to
apply to non-citizens as well as citizens.173 There should be no question
that those protections should extend to the most vulnerable immigrant
group—children. J.E.F.M. v. Lynch is not the final chapter in the discussion about the right to counsel for immigrant children. This need for
representation is prevalent in the proposed U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021
which recognizes the vulnerabilities of immigrant children and the dire
necessity to provide these children with the necessary legal protections
and representation.174 This bill proposes to reduce immigration court
backlogs, expand training for immigration judges, and authorize funding
for counsel for the representation children and other vulnerable individuals in order to promote the fair and efficient resolution of their claims.175
While the need for change is immediate, there should be some optimism
that the necessary change is in the near future. Until then, volunteer organizations and the public must continuously advocate for these children.

173

Supra note 125.
Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment to Modernize our Immigration System, WH.GOV (Jan. 20, 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-bidensends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-our-immigration-system/.
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